Chapter 2

Financing the Fleet

Graha Trans throws off enough cash to service its debt: 2025 operating cash flow of Rp92.9 billion was struck after Rp65.1 billion of interest, covering the finance bill 2.4 times [1]. That pushes near-term insolvency risk down. But the reported Rp107.6 billion of "debt repayment" is not deleveraging: the fleet grew on Rp240.8 billion of new lease and bank debt booked outside the cash-flow statement, and interest-bearing debt still rose to Rp727.9 billion. The business self-services its debt; it does not self-fund its growth.

Three years, three different cash-flow signatures

The cash-flow record since the March 2023 listing splits cleanly into three phases, and reading them in order is what the balance-sheet snapshot in Growth on Borrowed Money could not show.

Consolidated statements of cash flows, FY2023 Annual Report p.80, FY2024 Annual Report p.63, FY2025 Annual Report p.69 (figures in Rp billion).

2023 was the build. The company spent Rp209.6 billion on investing — mostly truck acquisitions and land down-payments — and funded it with Rp200.1 billion of financing inflows, of which Rp126.4 billion was fresh musyarakah (Islamic) financing [2]. This is the year the leverage in the thesis was laid down.

2024 was digestion. Capex fell sharply, financing turned to a Rp28.3 billion net outflow as the company began repaying, and operating cash flow dipped to Rp33.9 billion — management attributed the drop to extended customer payment terms and higher supplier and payroll outlays [3].

2025 was the cash surge. Operating cash flow nearly tripled to Rp92.9 billion, investing swung to a Rp13.1 billion inflow, and financing showed Rp107.6 billion going out the door [4]. Taken at face value, 2025 looks like a company that has turned the corner and is paying its debt down. Two of those three lines are less flattering than they read.

Operating cash flow is real, and it clears interest

The genuinely good line is the operating figure itself, and it is not a working-capital mirage. Cash receipts from customers were Rp627.8 billion against Rp656.3 billion of booked revenue [5][6] — the company collected 96% of what it invoiced. Trade receivables did rise, but more slowly than sales: days sales outstanding fell from roughly 131 days at end-2024 to 107 days at end-2025 [7]. Collections tightened; they were not stretched to manufacture the number.

Because interest is settled in cash and classified inside operating activities, the reported operating figure already carries the full finance burden. On the income statement, finance charges of Rp46.1 billion plus musyarakah financing cost of Rp19.0 billion sum to Rp65.1 billion [8] — the same Rp65.1 billion paid in cash [9]. There is no gap between accrued and paid interest to worry about.

Against that bill, coverage improved materially in 2025 and both cash and earnings measures agree.

Operating profit of Rp156.3 billion — gross profit of Rp224.3 billion less Rp68.1 billion of general and administrative expense — covered the Rp65.1 billion finance bill 2.4 times, up from 1.8 times in 2024 [10][11]. Measured on cash — operating cash flow before interest of Rp158.1 billion over Rp65.1 billion paid — the ratio is the same 2.4 times, versus a thin 1.5 times in 2024. For a reader whose first fear is bankruptcy, this is the reassuring half of the chapter: the trucks earn enough to pay the lenders, with a widening margin.

EBIT is gross profit less G&A; cash coverage is operating cash flow before interest divided by interest paid; FY2025 Annual Report pp.263–264, cash statement p.196.

The "deleveraging" is an accounting artefact

Now the line that reads better than it is. Financing activities showed Rp107.6 billion leaving the company in 2025, which invites the conclusion that debt is being retired. Yet interest-bearing debt rose over the year, from Rp578.6 billion to Rp727.9 billion — up Rp149.4 billion [12]. Both statements are true at once because most of the fleet Graha Trans added in 2025 never passed through the cash-flow statement.

The supplementary note is explicit: the company acquired Rp240.8 billion of fixed assets funded entirely by new debt — Rp193.3 billion through consumer-financing (lease) payables and Rp47.5 billion through a bank loan [13]. None of that is a cash outflow, so it is invisible in the Rp13.1 billion investing figure and the Rp107.6 billion financing figure. The reconciliation is the chapter in one table:

Interest-bearing debt from FY2025 Annual Report p.263; non-cash additions from Note 33, p.264; residual is a balancing item across cash draws, the new Rp12.7 bn overdraft and repayments.

Debt-to-equity, measured on interest-bearing debt, edged up from 1.81x to 1.88x despite a year of retained earnings adding to equity [14]. The pattern is a treadmill, not a paydown: operating cash amortises the existing lease and loan principal, while each replacement truck arrives on a fresh finance lease. It is a workable model — asset-backed lending against revenue-generating trucks is ordinary in this industry — but it means the leverage is refinanced and extended, not shrinking. Anyone reading the financing line as balance-sheet repair is reading it wrong.

One related item belongs in the same frame: Rp23.4 billion of cash left the company in 2025 as advances to related parties, booked as other receivables, versus Rp1.7 billion the year before [15]. In a year when every rupiah of financing headroom mattered, that outflow is worth tracking in the deeper governance work this report still owes.

The liquidity cushion is thinner than the balance sheet shows

The reassurance from coverage comes with a caveat the headline cash balance hides. The Rp19.7 billion of cash reported at end-2025 is a gross figure; the cash-flow statement reconciles to Rp7.0 billion after netting a new Rp12.7 billion bank overdraft the company drew during the year [16]. Real spendable cash is roughly a third of the stated number.

That cash position sits against what comes due inside twelve months.

Contractual maturity of financial liabilities, excluding future interest; FY2025 Annual Report p.262.

Rp113.2 billion of interest-bearing debt falls due within a year, alongside Rp36.1 billion of trade payables [17]. Net cash of Rp7.0 billion covers about a sixteenth of the near-term debt maturities alone. The company is not funded by a cash buffer; it is funded by the next twelve months of collections and by lenders continuing to roll and extend credit — a point management effectively concedes, describing liquidity as managed through cash-flow projections, loan-maturity schedules and available committed facilities rather than through cash on hand [18].

That structure is only as safe as the cash flow feeding it, which draws the two risks together. Operating cash flow of Rp92.9 billion clears the Rp113.2 billion of near-term maturities only with refinancing of the rolling balance; a sustained drop in collections would hit the tightest part of the structure first. And collections are concentrated — the top two customers were roughly two-thirds of nine-month 2025 revenue, a demand-durability question this report has flagged but not yet examined. The 2025 investing inflow leans on the same fragility from a different angle: it turned positive only because the company sold Rp97.1 billion of used trucks, against Rp60.5 billion of cash purchases [19]. Fleet-renewal proceeds of that size depend on a liquid secondhand-truck market; in a freight downturn, used-truck values and customer receipts would soften together, exactly when lease payments and maturities keep their schedule.

What this settles, and what it turns on

On the evidence, the immediate bankruptcy fear is not supported: 2025 operating cash flow covers interest 2.4 times and is improving, interest is fully paid in cash, and collections are tightening rather than slipping. The strongest fact against that comfort sits in the same statements — interest-bearing debt rose Rp149.4 billion to Rp727.9 billion even as the financing line implied repayment, because the fleet is funded by lease debt that never touches cash flow, and the spendable cash cushion is Rp7.0 billion against Rp113.2 billion of maturities inside a year. The read would change if operating cash coverage slipped back toward the 1.5 times of 2024, if the used-truck disposal channel dried up, or if lenders tightened the finance-lease terms the model depends on. The number to watch each period is operating cash flow before interest against the next twelve months of debt maturities; as long as the first comfortably exceeds the second, the model holds.